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Territorial Waters - Ownership and Control
THE UNITED STATES HAS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS TO THE SEABED BENEATH
THE ATLANTIC OCEAN LYING BEYOND THE THREE-MILE TERRITORIAL
LIMIT TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE ATLANTIC COASTAL STATES.
United States v. Maine,
420 U.S. 515, 95 S. Ct. 1155, 43 L.Ed. 2d 363 (1975).
The United States filed a complaint against the Atlantic Coas-
tal States of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Is-
land, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, alleging
that it had exclusive sovereign rights over each of them in the
submerged lands beneath the Atlantic Ocean located beyond 3
miles seaward from the outer limits of each respective state's coastal
waters and the outer edge of the continental shelf.' The federal
government claimed such rights for the purposes of exploration
and exploitation of the resources to be found in these submerged
lands. It requested declaratory and other "appropriate" relief
from the United States Supreme Court. 2 Except for Florida and
New York,3 all of the defendant states contended that they each
had title to the area by virtue of succeeding to the title formerly
held by England before the adoption of the Constitution.4 Ac-
cording to their argument, the states never divested themselves of
any interest in this property when they entered the Union. They
maintained that previous holdings to the contrary by the Court
were either factually distinguishable or should be reversed. s Orig-
inally, the Court ordered the appointment of a Special Master
after the United States had introduced a motion for summary judg-
ment. 6  The Special Master, based on the evidence presented to
1 420 U.S. 515 at 517.
2 id.
New York argued that it was the successor to the title formerly held by
Holland. Florida asserted that it had title to the seabed in certain places be-
yond 3 miles seaward from its coastline by virtue of a statute enacted by Con-
gress in 1868. It also contended that the Florida Straits were located in the
Gulf of Mexico and not in the Atlantic Ocean. This controversy was decided
by the Supreme Court in a separate case, United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531,
95 S. Ct. 1162, 43 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1975). Here the court rejected both of Florida's
arguments.
4 420 U.S. 515 at 517-518.
5 Id. at 518-519.
6 Id.
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him by the parties, found in favor the United States. 7 The Court
affirmed this finding and held that the United States had domin-
ion and exclusive sovereign rights over the seabed beneath the
Atlantic Ocean from a point seaward more than 3 geographical
miles from the ordinary low water mark of the defendant states'
coastline and inland waters (i.e. the 3-mile territorial limit).8
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The significance of the Maine decision and the Court's rea-
soning therein can be better understood by a knowledge of the
history of the law of this area. The sea is generally considered
to consist of three zones: 1) the internal or inland waters; 2) the
territorial or marginal sea as measured from the end of a coast-
line; and, 3) the high seas. 9 This discussion is concerned with the
second category of this classification.
A. International
Traditionally, nations have not been at all uniform in their
claims regarding territorial waters. One author commenting on
this problem almost 50 years ago noted this inconsistency had the
effect of impeding:
beneficial economic intercourse among the states, to say noth-
ing of the ill-feeling frequently caused in diplomatic circles
when one state has exceeded what another state conceives to be the
reasonable rule. . . . A confusion of laws on such a vital point
of world-wide significance has led . . . to dangerous fric-
tion.10
Many nations historically established a 3-mile territorial limit.
The rationale behind the adoption of such a position was based
on the so-called "cannon shot" theory. According to this princi-
ple, a country only was able to assert jurisdiction over the sea to
the extent of the shooting range of its cannons. This theory was
originally adopted sometime early in the 17th century." Later,
7 Id. at 519.
8 Id. at 526.
9 Note, Right Title and Interest in the Territorial Sea: Federal and State Claims in
the United States, 4 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 463 (1974).
10 Fraser, The Extent and Delimitation of Territorial Waters, 11 CORNELL L. Q.
455 (1926) at 456.
11 Id. at 457-465. See also FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 563 (1911)
and Note, Conflicting State and Federal Claims of Title in Submerged Lands of The
Continental Shelf, 56 YALE L. J. 356 (1947) at 365.
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during this same century, two scholars (Grotius in 1625 and Ger-
ber in 1639) mentioned it in their writings. 12 By the 18th century,
the theory began to attain international prominence when Cor-
nelius van Bynkershoek, a Dutch legal scholar, coined the phrase,
"potestatim terrae finiri, ubi fmitur armorun vis."' 1  The range
of cannon shot was expressed in terms of a fixed distance at about
this time when an Italian emissary to France declared that 3 miles
was the range of a cannon. 4 During the 19th century, the 3-mile
territorial limit gradually began to gain acceptance in other coun-
tries and was declared by statute, decree, treaty or other proclama-
tion. 5
Several other' nations, although adopting the basic principle of
a territorial water boundary, proclaimed such limits in terms of dif-
ferent distances. The Scandinavian countries of Norway and
Sweden developed laws establishing a 4-mile territorial limit,
while Spain became an example of a nation which adopted a
6-mile limit. 16 Several other countries have declared a territorial
limit of 12 miles, including Iran, Yemen, Sana, Morocco, Aden,
France and Oman. 17
There has been no total international agreement as yet regard-
ing territorial limits, although there have been several international
conferences where uniformity has been discussed. A recent attempt
took place in 1974 at Caracus, Venezuela. 18 Although no defi-
nite standard was reached, there was evidenced a growing senti-
ment to adopt a 12-mile territorial sea. The primary contingencies
12 Id. at 458.
13 van Bynkershoek, DeDomino Maris Cap. II quoted in Fraser, supra note
10, at 458.
14 Id.
15 Id. In 1818, the United States and England became the first two nations
to consummate a treaty providing for the 3-mile limit. The treaty concerned
an agreement reached between the two nations regarding their respective fish-
ing rights in North America.
16 Id. Norway declared such a limit in 1747. This proclamation apparently
stemmed from a desire to maintain exclusive fishing rights as against foreign
interests. By 1788, Sweden had established a limit of one Scandinavian ma-
rine league (equal to four English miles) for neutrality purposes. Spain first
proclaimed a 6-mile limit in 1760.
17 Grandison and Meyer, International Straits, Global Communications, and the
Evolving Law of the Sea, 8 VANDERBILT J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1975) at 404.
1s Buzan, Time-lag Could Jeopardize Progress Toward Law of the Sea, INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1974) at 26. Other prior conferences in this regard in-
clude the 1930 Hague Codification Conference established by the League of
Nations and the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1959 and 1960.




surrounding the adoption of such a policy were assent to free tran-
sit through straits and agreement on a 200-mile exclusive economic
zone. 19
B. United States
The United States made its first statement regarding the adop-
tion of a 3-mile territorial limit in 1793 when the then Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson declared that a zone of this distance would
be recognized and enforced for purposes of neutrality. 20 Almost
a century later, by means of dictum in Manchester v. Massachusetts,2'
the Supreme Court recognized 3 miles (or one marine league) sea-
ward from the coast as the minimum limit of the territorial juris-
diction of a nation over tide waters. The 3-mile rule was specifi-
cally affirmed by the Court in 1923 when it asserted:
It is now settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere
that the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land
areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors, bays,
and other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast, and a mar-
ginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line outward a
marine league, or three geographic miles.22
However, in recent years, there have been indications that the
United States is considering changing its position. Such a change
of position was advocated by this country at the 1958 Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea,2 3 and in 1971 a treaty was
executed approving a 12-mile territorial "coastal zone" for purposes
of the testing of nuclear weapons on the seabed.24
II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE STATES
There was widespread disagreement leading up to the Maine
decision between the federal government and the states regarding
rights to the seabed beneath territorial waters. Although it is well-
settled that the lands underlying inland waters are subject to ex-
11 Grandison and Meyer, supra note 17, at 393.
20 6 VALPARISO U. L. REV. 170 at 177. See also WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(3rd ea. 1939) § 38.
21 139 U.S. 240, 11 S.Ct. 559, 35 LEd. 159 (1891).
22 Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122, 43 S.Ct. 504, 507, 67 L.Ed.
894, 902 (1923).
23 6 VALPARISO UNIVERSITY L. REV. 170 at 179.
2 Id. at 182.
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clusive state ownership,25 the law with respect to the lands beyond
this point has not been so clear.
In 1945, President Truman declared that the natural resources
of the submerged lands beneath the seas bordering the coastline
of the United States were to be under its exclusive jurisdiction
and control.2 This declaration has been generally referred to by
commentators as the Truman Proclamation.2 However, on the
same day this proclamation was asserted, Truman also issued an
executive order which had the effect of limiting it. The order stated
in significant part:
[the] proclamation shall not be deemed to affect the determina-
tion by legislation of judicial decree of any issues between the
United States and the several states, relating to the ownership
and control of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf
within or outside of the three-mile limit. 28
The Supreme Court first ruled on the conflict in 1947. In
United States v. California,29 it was held that the federal govern-
ment and not California owned the 3-mile marginal belt off its
coastline and that incidental to this ownership was dominion over
25 United States v. Mission Rock Co., 189 U.S. 391, 23 S.Ct. 606, 47 L.Ed.
865 (1903). The Supreme Court held that the state of California had title to the
land under the San Francisco Bay, reasoning that it had become subject to state
ownership when California joined the Union. Half a century earlier, the Court
had determined that Alabama had title to the land underlying the navigable
waters within its boundaries as against the federal government in Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845).
26 Proclamation 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to the Nat-
ural Resources of the Subsoil and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, 3 C.F.R.
67 (1943-1948 Comp.).
27 6 VALPARISO U. L. REV. 170 at 177. See also Borgese, Boom, Doom, and
Gloom Over the Oceans: the Economic Zone, the Developing Nations, and the Law of
the Sea, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 543-544 (1974). Borgese notes that the
Truman Proclamation had a significant impact. The oil industry "kicked and
screamed against [it] . . . [and] called it creeping Communism, foreshadow-
ing the end of the oil industry as we know it." Other nations made territorial
claims regarding the seabed after the Truman Proclamation including Argentina
in 1946, Chile in 1947, and Peru in 1948, which claimed both the ocean seabed
and the superjacent waters out of a limit of two hundred miles. Also, the same
writer comments that "the Truman Proclamation was universalized in the
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, now ratified by forty-nine nations
. . . [and] on the part of the developing nations, this was followed by the Dec-
laration of Santo Domingo in 1972, proposing the creation of the 'Patrimonial
Sea' and the Yaonunde Declaration, advocating the 'economic zone' of 200
miles."
28 Executive Order 9633, Reserving and Placing Certain Resources of the
Continental Shelf Under the Control and Jurisdiction of the Secretary of the In-
terior, 3 C.F.R. 437 (1943-1948 Comp.).
29 332 U.S. 19, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889.
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the natural resources to be found in the submerged lands of this
area. This case involved a suit by the United States against Cali-
fornia, contending that the federal government was the fee simple
owner of these lands and the resources and minerals found therein.
It also alleged that California had entered into lease agreements
authorizing certain persons and corporations to extract natural re-
sources such as oil and gas from the seabed and that this constituted
a trespass, since the federal government had paramount power over
this area. The federal government thought this to be unlawful
even though California, in executing the leases, was acting in ac-
cordance with its statutory authority. As its defense, California
answered: 1) it had ownership of the area in question because it
was within the original boundaries of the state which were formed
when it succeeded into the territory formerly held by the Crown of
England; 2) the suit was barred by the doctrines of res judicata
because of the previous Supreme Court decisions in the Mission
Rock and Pollard's Lessee cases; 3° 3) Congress had pursued a policy
of acquiescence with regard to the state's purported ownership
of this property; and, 4) the federal government was estopped from
asserting rights to these lands by its prior conduct. The Court
rejected each one of these arguments. First, the Court stated
that none of the original 13 states ever acquired ownership to the
submerged lands off their coasts and that there was no historical
evidence to the contrary. Since none of the original states acquired
ownership, California could not because it had been admitted to
the Union "on an equal footing with the original states in all re-
spects. "31 Second, the Mission Rock and Pollard's Lessee cases
were factually distinguishable from the California case in that they
concerned lands under or bordering inland waters as opposed to
land underlying the ocean. Third, the Court commented that
federal control of the 3-mile belt was essential to national security
and interstate commerce. Finally, although it did make reference
to some prior conduct by agencies of the federal government such
as the Department of the Interior as possibly indicating a belief
that ownership of the property in issue resided in California, the
Court refused to allow the federal government to be bound by any
negligent acts of its agents. This reluctance to apply the tradi-
tional rules of agency was justified on the theory that:
The Government, which holds its interests here as elsewhere in
trust for all the people, is not to be deprived of those interests by
'o See note 25, supra.
31 332 U.S. 19, 30.
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the ordinary court rules designed particularly for private dis-
putes over individually owned pieces of property, and officers
who have no authority at all to dispose of Government property
cannot by their conduct cause the Government to lose its valu-
able rights by their acquiescence, laches, or failure to act. 32
The Court had occasion to address similar issues in 1950 in United
States v. Louisiana33 and United States v. Texas.34 The Louisiana case
involved a complaint by the United States that it had exclusive owner-
ship and rights in the submerged lands in an area extending from the
low water mark on the Louisiana coastline to a point extending 27
miles into the Gulf of Mexico. The federal government also
contended that because Louisiana had executed leases to persons and
corporations for the purpose of drilling wells for the extraction of oil
and other resources from the seabed and had received rents and other
financial benefits in consideration therefrom, the state should be
enjoined from continuing to trespass in this area and should be re-
quired to account for any money obtained from such leases after
June 23, 1947. Louisiana asserted that its claim to the lands in
issue was based upon statutory authority 35 and that they consti-
tuted the state's southern boundary. The state also argued: 1) it
had ownership of the property in issue by virtue of its continuous
and undisputed possession dating from the time Louisiana attained
statehood; and, 2) in the alternative, even if the federal govern-
ment was deemed to have paramount rights and control over the
area in issue, that Louisiana could still lawfully execute and de-
rive funds from the leases since this practice conflicted with no
existing federal laws. The Court upheld the claim of the United
States, declaring the rights of the federal government to be para-
mount in this property and rendered the requested relief. The
California case was cited as precedent. The Court determined
that the question to be decided in the case was whether the state
had paramount authority to the exclusion of the federal govern-
ment over the property in issue. -Its answer was that Louisiana,
like California, had never acquired ownership in the submerged
lands of the marginal 3-mile belt. Since the California case es-
tablished the principle that the federal government had ownership
and control of the 3-mile belt, the Court presumed that any area
beyond this point would be governed by the same rule.36
32 Id. at 40.
33 339 U.S. 699, 70 S.Ct. 914, 94 L.Ed. 216 (1950).
34 339 U.S. 707, 70 S.Ct. 918, 94 L.Ed. 1221 (1950).
35 339 U.S. 699 at 703.
' The Court specifically commented in its opinion that:
[Vol. 8: 240
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The Texas case concerned a claim by the United States that it
had ownership rights to the submerged lands from a point begin-
ning at the ordinary low water mark of the Gulf of Mexico off
the Texas coastline extending seaward to the outer edge of the
continental shelf. The federal government petitioned the Court
for an injunction against Texas to prevent that state from continuing
to trespass on this property and also sought an order requiring that
state to make an accounting for all income derived therefrom after
June 23, 1947. Texas contended that although the federal gov-
ernment might have paramount powers over this area with regard
to navigation (pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the Consti-
tution) these powers do not extend to ownership or the right to
control the extraction of oil and other resources from the sub-
merged lands. Also, although somewhat different in form from
the arguments previously asserted by California and Louisiana, 37
Texas argued that it had title to this property. According to its
argument, Texas was an independent nation before it attained
statehood and as such had possession and control over the prop-
erty and the resources therein. These rights were allegedly
recognized by the federal government when Texas joined the
Union and since that time Texas had maintained undisputed
control, possession and jurisdiction over the property. The Court
ruled in favor of the federal government and granted the relief
requested, commenting that even if Texas had had both owner-
ship and control over this property during the time she was an
If, as we held in California's case, the three mile belt is in the domain
of the nation rather than that of the separate states, it follows a (or-
tiori that the area beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward of
the marginal belt is perhaps even more directly related to the national
defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, and world commence than is the
marginal sea.
339 U.S. 699 at 705.
37 In its opinion the Court distinguished Texas' argument from California's
as follows:
The sum of the argument is that prior to annexation Texas had both
dominiutn (ownership or proprietary rights) and iinperiut (Govern-
mental powers of regulation and control) as respects the lands, min-
erals, and other products underlying the marginal sea. In the case of
California, we found that she, like the original thirteen colonies, never
had dominium over that area. The first claim to the marginal sea was as-
serted by the National Government. We held that protection and con-
trol of it were indeed a function of national external sovereignty. . ..
The status of Texas, it is said, is different: Texas, when she came into
the Union, retained the dominium over the marginal sea which she had
previously acquired and transferred to the National Government
only her powers of sovereignty - her imperiutn - over the marginal sea.
339 U.S. 707 at 712-713.
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independent nation, she divested herself of any claim to the
marginal sea or seabed when she was admitted into the Union on
an "equal footing" with the existing states. 38
However, Congress severely limited, if not implicitly over-
ruled the holdings of these cases (especially with regard to the
California decision) when it enacted the Submerged Lands Act in
1953. 39  This statute provided that the states had ownership of
the 3-mile marginal belt off their coastlines ° However, the fed-
eral government was to retain paramount rights to this area for
purposes of navigation, commerce, national defense, and inter-
national affairs. 4t  It should be noted that this statute implicitly
placed a limit on state rights to the 3 miles from their respective
coastlines and made no provision for the extension of state boun-
38 The "equal footing" clause was originally interpreted to give states owner-
ship as against the federal government to shores and submerged lands under
navigable rivers within their boundaries. The Court notes that here it "works
the same way in the converse situation presented by this case. It negatives any
implied, special limitation of any of the paramount powers of the United States
in favor of a State." Id. at 717.
N 43 U.S.C.A. §5 1301 et seq. (1964).
40 The applicable provision of the Act states that:
The seaward boundary of each original coastal state is approved and
confirmed as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast-
line. . . . Any State admitted subsequent to the formation of the
Union which has not already done so may extend its seaward boun-
daries of the United States in the Great Lakes or any other body of
water traversed by such boundaries. ...
Id. § 1312.
§ 1313 of the Act enumerates several exceptions to the above rule, in-
cluding . . . all lands expressly retained or ceded to the United States
when the State entered the Union (otherwise than by a general reten-
tion or cession of lands underlying the marginal sea); all lands acquired
by the United States by eminent domain proceedings, purchase, ces-
sion, gift, or otherwise in a proprietary capacity; all lands filled in,
built-up, or otherwise reclaimed by the United States for its own use
• . . under claim of right.
Id. § 1313.
4i The statute specifically states that:
the United States retains all its navigational servitude and rights in and
powers of regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters
for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national de-
fense, and international affairs, all of which shall be paramount to but
shall not be deemed to include proprietary rights of ownership, or the
rights of . . . leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural
resources . . . vested in and assigned to the respective states . . . by
§ 1311. . ..
This provision indicates that the states were given control over the extraction
and exploitation of the natural resources of this area. Id. § 1314(a).
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daries beyond this point.42 During this same year, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 43 Also in 1953 the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act was adopted by Congress.
This statute specifically gave the federal government control over
the submerged lands beyond the 3-mile marginal belt."
Thus the law on this subject has had a brief but somewhat
complicated history. Between 1947 and 1953, the law regarding
federal as opposed to state rights to the seabed completely
changed. It first accorded the federal government paramount
rights to the 3-mile marginal belt and subsequently granted owner-
ship and control over these lands to the respective states. Finally,
it subjected the area seaward beyond this point to the dominion
and control of the federal government.
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN THE Maine CASE
Here the Supreme Court adopted the Special Master's find-
ings that the decisions in the California, Louisiana and Texas deci-
sions were controlling. The views expressed in these cases by the
states concerning historical interpretation as to the status of title
to the lands also advanced by the defendants herein, were re-
jected. According to the Court, title to the seabed became vested
in the federal government when the defendant states were ad-
mitted to the Union on an "equal footing" with the original states
and that therefore it had the power to determine how the re-
sources in these lands were to be exploited. Even though Con-
gress did grant the states rights to the seabed within the 3-mile
belt by the Submerged Lands Act, 45 this was consistent with na-
tional power over this area since there was nothing in the above-
mentioned cases proscribing the federal government from making
such a conveyance.46  In addition, because this statute only de-
clared that states had rights in the lands underlying the 3-mile
belt, there was nothing to defeat federal government rights to the
42 6 VALPARISO U. L. REV. 170 at 178.
43 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 74 S.Ct. 481, 98 L.Ed. 689 (1954).
44 43 U.S.C.A. % 1331(a)-1332, (1964). See also Rathje, Saving Byron's Sea:
Federal and State Regulation of Oil Pollution from Ocean Petroleum Production, 22
HASTINcS L. J. 485, (February, 1971). There the writer comments that "[the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act] clearly expresses Congressional desire
to involve the Federal Government in the lucrative practice of leasing off-shore
oil lands to oil companies for petroleum development." id. at 490-491.
45 See Note 39 supra.
46 The Court agreed with the Special Master, commenting that: "the court
in its prior cases 'did not indicate that the federal government by Act of Con-
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area beyond this point.47  This principle was expressly affirmed
by Congress in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.48 The
Court also noted that the doctrine of stare decisis was applicable.
Since the decisions in the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases,
much business regarding the submerged lands has been conducted
in reliance upon the holdings rendered therein as well as on the
above-mentioned Congressional enactments. Such conduct should
not be disturbed by overruling this body of law. 49 The Court as-
serted that this judicial and legislative precedent has served to put
the states on notice that claims such as those advanced in the
Maine case are contrary to existing law and will be looked upon
with disfavor.
IV. EFFECT ON THE LAW APPERTAINING TO SEABED RIGHTS
The Maine decision serves to clarify the law of the United
States regarding federal as opposed to state rights to the sub-
merged lands underlying ocean waters. The present law can be
summarized as follows:
1) Title and control over submerged lands underlying in-
land waters resides in the respective states;
2) The states have paramount control and rights to the
seabed underlying the ocean waters within the 3-mile territorial
belt off their respective coastlines except with regard to com-
merce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs5s
gress might not, as it did by the subsequently enacted Submerged Lands Act
grant to the riparian states rights to the resources of the federal area, subject to
the reservation by the federal government of its rights and powers of regulation
and the control for the purposes of commerce, navigation, national defense, and
international affairs." 420 U.S. 515 at 524-525.
47 One section of the 1953 Submerged Lands Act specifically states that, at
least with regard to natural resources, the statute in no way abrogates federal
government rights to the seabed outside of the three mile niargin'al belt. 43
U.S.C.A. § 1302.
41 Id. % 1331 et seq.
49An especially great amount of business has been transacted during the
past two decades in the resources of the seabed. It is noted that:
since 1953 when this legislation [the Submerged Lands Act and the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act] was enacted, 33 lease sales have
been held, in which 1,940 leases, embracing over eight million acres,
have been issued. The Outer Continental Shelf, since 1953, has yielded
over three billion barrels of oil, 19 trillion m.c.f. of natural gas, 13 mil-
lion long tons of sulfur, and over four million long tons of salt. In
1973 alone, 1,081,000 barrels of oil and 8.9 billion cubic feet of natural
gas were extracted daily from the Outer Continental Shelf.
420 U.S. 515 at 527-528.
50 However, federal control over this area is prohibited with regard to the
[Vol. 8: 240
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These latter powers inhere in the federal government as an inci-
dent of national sovereignty;
3) The federal government has paramount control and
rights to the seabed beyond this 3-mile territorial belt.
V. POSSIBLE FUTURE IMPACT OF THE Maine DECISION
The Maine decision may be significant in several respects.
It could possibly have an effect on the law of other nations, the
petroleum industry, the fishing industry, and environmental pro-
tection.
A. Other Nations
The case may have an impact on other nations where similar
disputes have arisen between federal and local governments over
submerged lands. One country where such a conflict apparently
exists is Australia.si This nation issued an edict in the Seas and
Submerged Lands Act, enacted by her Parliament in 1973, de-
claring that the Commonwealth had sovereign rights in the coun-
try's continental shelf. However, controversy rages as to the
constitutional validity of this statute, especially with regard to the
seabed within 3 miles of Australia's coastline. One writer con-
cedes that the local governments have exercised some power over
this area during the last century, including the authorization of
construction of breakwaters and piers to sewage outlets and the
leasing of off-shore mining rights. He argues that despite these
''small encroachments" paramount rights to the area reside in the
Commonwealth. s2 If this question should be resolved in favor of
management, leasing, use, development, or proprietary rights to the land or the
resources found therein. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1314(a) (1964).
51 Australia, like the United States, asserts a 3-mile territorial limit. See
Windeyer, The Seabed in Law, 6 FEDERAL L. REV. 1 (1974) at 13.
52 Id. at 18-19. He specifically asserts that:
such small encroachments . . . do not in law equate 'dominium' over
the whole bed of the territorial sea. They are rather attributable . . .
to an unchallenged recognition of acquisitions for the satisfaction by
the local governments of local needs not involving any further asser-
tions of title . . . . The Commonwealth of Australia now has the
rights that by international law a nation has in its territorial waters.
And it is the Commonwealth, not the States, that may need to assert
these rights; for the national interests which they protect, defence,
health, and quarantine, immigration, overseas shipping, customs dues,
are all within Commonwealth control.
It is also somewhat interesting to note that somewhat similar to the United
States Supreme Court in the California, Louisiana and Texas decisions, Windeyer
interprets history to support his proposition that the lands in question never
1976]
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the local governments, a dispute similar to the one in the Maine
case may arise as to federal and local rights beyond this 3-mile
belt.5 3 The Maine opinion may then be viewed as a possible mode
of solution to the problem s4
B. Oil and Other Natural Resources
Exploitation of the natural resources of the seabed has per-
haps been the primary reason for the conflicting federal and state
claims in these lands. The facts of the California, Louisiana, Texas
and Maine cases all dealt partially with the question of whether
the federal government or the states had power to execute leases
for the extraction of such resources and the derivation of revenue
therefrom. Such leases, especially those concerning the drilling
of oil wells, constitute a source from which a great deal of money
can be obtained, from both the rent paid on the leases and the
taxes imposed on the lessees.55 Under the Maine decision, the
vested in the local governments when they ceased to be colonies of the British
Empire. Instead he believes that they became subject to the dominion of the
federal government, even if no precise time could be ascertained as to when this
actually took place.
s3 The High Court of Australia has held that "Australian waters" of the
sea are determined by "geographical and political considerations" and may
extend beyond the 3-mile marginal belt. However, the judges sitting on that
court apparently disagree as to the question of local boundaries and rights with
regard to such waters. See Bonser v. La Macchia, 122 C.L.R. 177 (1970).
54 Canada also has dealt with this problem to some extent but has reached
a somewhat different solution than the United States. In 1967, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the federal government had dominion, jurisdiction,
and power over the submerged lands both within the 3-mi-le territorial belt
and beyond it as against -the province of British Columbia. Incidental to these
rights was deemed the power to explore and exploit that natural resources found
therein. The court reasoned that not only did Canada have paramount rights
to these lands by virtue of national sovereignty, it regarded British Columbia
as never being the owner of these lands. See Reference Re Off-shore Mineral
Rights, 65 D.L.R. 2d 353 (1967).
55 One writer, in commenting upon the financial effect of such leasing with
regard to the federal government, notes that:
Major leasing commenced in 1968 when the Department of the Interior
offered 100 blocks of submerged ocean lands for lease; 75 of the blocks
were leased by petroleum companies, and the Federal Government
received $603 million from the bids. Only 15 of the blocks have been
developed by the petroleum industry to date [as of 1971], but each
lease area, after full development, has a potential for 150 wells. Con-
sequently, 11,000 wells may eventually be drilled in the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf area as a result of the 1968 leasing. Rathje at 492.
The economic importance from the leasing of these lands was also consid-
ered by the Supreme Court in its opinion in the Maine case. See Note 49 supra.
Besides oil, there are other significant resources to be exploited in the seabed.
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states may execute leases within the 3-mile marginal belt while
the federal government has the same opportunity in the seabed
beyond this point.
However, another aspect of some importance, especially with
regard to oil, is the conservation of such resources. For the past
several years the United States, like many other countries, has
suffered through a so-called "energy crisis." To make this na-
tion less dependent on other countries for its oil, more national
control of the petroleum industry may be necessary. Also, this
may be necessary to insure that oil extracted from the seabed off
the coastline of a particular state is used for the benefit of the
whole country rather than just the inhabitants of the respective
states. The Maine decision not only provides for exclusive federal
regulation over the extraction of such oil beyond the 3-mile terri-
torial limit, but also proposes that it could possess such powers
within this limit if national security or commerce was involved.56
C. Fishing
The fishing industry constitutes an important facet of the
United States economy. While regulation by states of the sea
and seabed may provide significant financial benefits to local
treasuries by taxation of fisheries located off their respective
coastlines, national regulation may be essential to insure free
competition among private industries and other nations.5 7 Under
the Maine decision, a compromise solution is effected. The states
These include minerals, such as manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt. Through
modern mining techniques, such resources may be readily extracted, causing
them to be a large potential source for revenue. See Muskie, Forward, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 535, 537 (1974).
56 420 U.S. 515 at 525.
57 For an interesting economic analysis of the fishing industry from an inter-
national perspective, see Anderson, Economic Aspects of Fisheries Utilization in the
Law of the Sea Negotiations, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 656 (May 1974). One specific
example of the economic effect of the rule providing for exclusive federal con-
trol beyond the 3-mile territorial limit can be seen by considering the plight
of Florida. In this state, the shrimp industry nets approximately $16 million
annually. The shrimp beds on which this industry is primarily dependent are
located approximately fifty miles west of Key West. Before the Supreme
Court's decision in United States vs. Florida (see Note 3, supra), the Florida De-
partment of Natural Resources regulated these beds in such a manner as to pre-
vent their depletion. However, since the beds are located beyond 3 miles from
Florida's coastline, they will no longer be subject to state control. This has
caused a concern that the harvesting of the beds may not be closely regulated
by the federal government, possibly resulting in their economic ruin. Cubbison,
Court Decisions May Peril Shrimp Beds, St. Petersburg Times, March 18, 1975, at
5A.
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can regulate fishing within the 3-mile belt while it is subject to
federal control beyond this point.5 8
D. National Security
Although the Court in the Maine case makes a distinction
between the extent of federal and state rights in the seabed, the
opinion also comments that the federal government has paramount
rights to this area, even that which is within the 3-mile limit, if a
question of national security is involved5s One aspect of national
security which is especially relevant to the seabed is nuclear
weaponry. With the increasing sophistication of modern tech-
nology, the chances increase that the seabed may be one location
where such armaments may be positioned.60 Another effect of
the Maine decision is to recognize legally the federal government's
regulatory powers over the seabed for this purpose.
E. The Environment
The exploitation of the resources of the seabed may have an
adverse effect on the environment. Ocean pollution is an example
of one possible consequence. The drilling of oil wells may be a
significant cause of this pollution.61 However, the interest in
protecting the environment must be balanced against the urgent
11 A bill has been recently introduced in the United States Senate provid-
ing for the creation of a fishing zone of a distance of 197 miles beyond the
3-mile territorial limit over which the federal government would have exclu-
sive control. The purpose of this proposal is to protect the domestic fishing
industry as against foreign interests. This bill also narrows the power of the
states to regulate resources within the 3-mile limit. As of February, 1976, both
the House and the Senate had adopted similar versions of the bill, the primary
difference being the date on which law would become effective. See Note,
Mare Nostrum, Vastrum Et Clausum: jurisdiction Over Sea, Seabed, and Subsoil, 4
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 131, 143-144 (Spring 1975). See
also, A 200 Mile Limit to Protect U.S. Fishing Rights, U.S. News & World Report,
February 9, 1976 at 30.
59 420 U.S. 515 at 525.
60 Gorove, Toward Denuclearization of the Ocean Floor, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
504 (1970) at 504.
61 One author comments that:
The development of petroleum resources located in the submerged
lands contributes substantially to the discharge of oil into the oceans.
Although the amount of oil presently released by the off-shore petrol-
eum industry is not as great as that released by onshore industries,
offshore petroleum drilling involves the danger of massive discharges
of oil into the marine environment. Such discharges may significant-
ly affect other beneficial uses of marine resources. Moreover, the
growth of the ocean petroleum industry may involve an increasing num-
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need to develop these seabed resources which has surfaced be-
cause of the present "energy crisis."
The problem of environmental protection is made even worse
if there is confusion as to what set of regulations (federal or state)
must be followed by a company engaged in the extraction of
resources from the seabed.62 The Maine decision somewhat
clarifies this problem. Since the boundary between federal and
state control of the seabed is now the 3-mile territorial limit,
those businesses involved in extraction operations will be more
certain about which set of governmental rules must be complied
with. However, uniformity in regulatory rules would be desirable.
It would make for easier administration and better environmental
protection if the federal government and the states established a
single set of regulations and provided for their enforcement
through some sort of cooperative effort.
VI. CONCLUSION
Thus the Maine decision, as the above analysis indicates, is of
important significance to the law of the sea and seabed. It
clarifies federal and state rights in the submerged lands, using
the 3-mile territorial limit as the primary distinguishing factor.
her of oil spill incidents unless new ways are found to prevent their
occurrence. Rathje at 486.
It should also be noted that there are other possible sources of oil pollution
besides undersea oil exploration. These include: 1) oil slicks from oil tankers
and other ships running aground or colliding with other ships or objects while at
sea, 2) deballasting by oil tanker ships, 3) the cleaning of tanks of oil tanker
ships, 4) oil leakage from ships sunk in the oceans, and 5) the seepage of oil
from natural sources. There are several possible attributes of oil pollution, such
as: 1) an adverse effect on marine life, since certain types of fish are especially
susceptible to this and their death could blight to some extent a traditional
source of food; 2) an adverse effect on water birds, since these birds seem to
have a special attraction to oil slicks and die from drowning, poisoning, expo-
sure, or starvation because of their feathers becoming soaked with oil; 3) dam-
age to beaches and coastal residential property, curtailing swimming (which in
turn means a substantial loss of revenue for commercial beach operators)
and creating unpleasant odors for occupants of these areas; and 4) causing danger-
ous and hazardous conditions with regard to navigation and increasing the
possibility of a fire. See Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HARV. INT'L L. J.
316 (1969).
62 It has been observed that:
Petroleum companies follow different regulations when drilling in
federal waters than when drilling in waters subject to the control of the
state. Different administrators and inspectors, following different
guidelines, check to determine if oil companies are complying with
drilling regulations. In the event of a spill, different agencies are con-
cerned with clean-up procedures. Finally, both the state and federal
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However, the effect of this case on the law of this area may be
greatly diminished if the United States should abandon its present
policy regarding the recognition of this 3-mile territorial limit.
There is speculation that this country is now considering the
adoption of a 12-mile territorial limit.63 If this should occur, a
dispute may arise as to whether the rights of states in the seabed
extend to 12 miles from their respective coastlines or remain con-
fined to a 3-mile marginal belt.64 The Supreme Court or Con-
gress may then have to take further action to resolve this con-
flict.65
JAMES D. DENNIS
administrative agencies have the authority to allow drilling anywhere
in the areas of their respective control, despite the protestations of the
other government. Inherent in this dual system of regulations and
responsibilities is the possibility of error resulting from confusion.
Rathje at 488-489.
63 See Note, supra note 9, at 479.
64 if such a change should formally occur, the states might argue that since
their seaward boundaries have been determined as the territorial limit, which tra-
ditionally has been three miles from their respective coastlines, such boundaries
should automatically extend to twelve miles. An example of a context in which
such a dispute might arise is with regard to economic regulation of objects on
both sides of the territorial line of demarcation. Under the present law, one
writer has hypothecated a situation where:
a deep water superport located ten miles off the coast would re-
quire a pipeline to an inland refinery. As authority is now allocated
between the federal government and the states, a pipeline would be
controlled by the state for the first three miles and the federal govern-
ment for the last seven miles. Any conflict in regulations might lead to
inconsistent demands being made on the construction of the pipeline.
I . . d. at 480.
However, if a 12-mile territorial limit is adopted and state rights to the seabed
are extended to this point, such a pipeline would arguably be subject to para-
mount state regulation.
65 The United States has already adopted a 12-mile territorial limit for the
purpose of regulating nuclear weaponry. Iti .1971, it executed a treaty proscrib-
ing the placement of such armaments beyond a 12-mile zone. See Note 24.
One writer regards the significance of this action as constituting ". . . an
awareness of the trend toward extended territorial seas, if not a tacit recogni-
tion of the 12-mile outer limit by the United States as a signatory power." 6
VALPARISO U. L. REV. 170 at 183.
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